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Abstract 
Interoception, the perception of the body’s internal state, contributes to numerous aspects of 
higher-order cognition. Several theories suggest a causal role for atypical interoception in 
specific psychiatric disorders, including a recent claim that atypical interoception represents a 
transdiagnostic impairment across disorders characterised by reduced perception of one’s 
own emotion (‘alexithymia’). Such theories are supported predominantly by evidence from 
only one interoceptive domain (cardiac), however evidence of domain-specific interoceptive 
ability highlights the need to assess interoception in non-cardiac domains. Using novel 
interoceptive tasks, we demonstrate that individuals high in alexithymic traits show a reduced 
propensity to utilise interoceptive cues to gauge respiratory output (Experiment 1), and 
reduced accuracy on tasks of muscular effort (Experiment 2) and taste sensitivity 
(Experiment 3), unrelated to any co-occurring autism, depression or anxiety. Results suggest 
that alexithymia reflects a multi-domain, multi-dimensional failure of interoception, which is 
consistent with theories suggesting that atypical interoception may underpin both symptom 
commonalities between psychiatric disorders, and heterogeneity within disorders.  
 
Keywords: Alexithymia, Interoception, p-factor, Autism Spectrum Disorder, Anxiety, 
Depression. 
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Introduction 
The study of interoception has undergone something of a resurgence in recent years. 
The term interoception refers to the perception of the body’s internal state (Craig, 2002). As 
such, hunger, thirst, respiratory and cardiac signals are all interoceptive in nature. Whilst the 
term interoception was initially used exclusively to refer to visceral sensations, (e.g., Fowler, 
2003), contemporary definitions have expanded its use to refer to bodily signals that do not 
readily meet the criteria to be considered internal (e.g., sensual or affective touch, tickle, taste 
and muscular exertion) but which are processed by common neural pathways (e.g., Craig, 
2005; Wilson, Andrew, & Craig, 2002; Löken, Wessberg, McGlone & Olausson, 2009; 
Craig, 2002). Thus, more recent definitions of interoception include bodily information sent 
either via 1) small diameter (unmyelinated) C-fibres or (myelinated) Aδ-fibres, lamina I, the 
spinothalamic tract and then on to the insula and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) – the ‘spinal 
homeostatic pathway’ (Craig, 2002), or 2) cranial nerves (vagus and glossopharyngeal) to the 
nucleus of the solitary tract and on to the insula and ACC  - the ‘cranial homeostatic 
pathway’ (Critchley & Harrison, 2013; see also Ceunen, Vlaeyen, & Van Diest, 2016; 
Murphy, Brewer, Catmur, & Bird, 2017).  
The renewed interest in interoception as a topic of scientific study has been driven by 
two complementary research aims. The first is concerned with establishing the extent to 
which interoceptive ability contributes to typical cognition, while the second assesses the 
clinical impact of atypical interoceptive ability. With respect to typical cognition, 
interoception has been shown to contribute towards various aspects of learning (Katkin, 
Wiens, & Ohman, 2001), decision-making (Werner, Jung, Duschek, & Schandry, 2009) and 
emotional processing (Füstös, Gramann, Herbert, & Pollatos, 2013; Schandry, 1981; 
Terasawa, Fukushima, & Umeda, 2013; Wiens, Mezzacappa, & Katkin, 2000). This evidence 
of the role of interoception in typical cognition is consistent with clinically-focussed research 
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which has highlighted the relevance of atypical interoception for mental health (Brewer, 
Cook, & Bird, 2016; Khalsa & Lapidus, 2016; Naqvi & Bechara, 2010; Paulus & Stein, 2006; 
Quattrocki & Friston, 2014; Verdejo-Garcia, Clark, & Dunn, 2012). Indeed, within 
psychiatry and clinical psychology there is a relatively long theoretical history suggesting a 
causal role for atypical interoception across psychiatric and neurological disorders (Barrett & 
Simmons, 2015; Brewer et al., 2016; Quattrocki & Friston, 2014), with long-standing claims 
of reduced awareness of interoceptive signals in Feeding and Eating Disorders (Khalsa & 
Lapidus, 2016; Klabunde, Acheson, Boutelle, Matthews, & Kaye, 2013; Pollatos et al., 
2008), and hyper-awareness of interoceptive signals in anxiety (Khalsa & Lapidus, 2016; 
Paulus & Stein, 2006) and panic disorder (Clark et al., 1997; Ehlers & Breuer, 1992; Ehlers, 
1993).  
Among contemporary theories of the contribution of interoceptive ability to 
psychopathology, one of the most well-developed is that of Quattrocki and Friston (2014) 
which maps in impressive detail how an interoceptive impairment can cause the social, 
sensory and self-representation symptoms of Autism Spectrum Disorder (henceforth 
“autism”). While generally endorsing this theory, Brewer, Happé, Cook, and Bird (2015) 
have argued for two modifications. The first is that interoceptive deficit does not result in 
autism, but instead characterises alexithymia (a sub-clinical condition characterised by 
difficulty identifying and describing one’s own emotions (Nemiah, Freyberger, & Sifneos, 
1976)), which frequently co-occurs with autism (Berthoz & Hill, 2005). This suggestion has 
been tested empirically; in support of Brewer and colleagues’ contention, when autism and 
alexithymia are dissociated, it is alexithymia and not autism that is associated with 
interoceptive ability (Shah, Hall, Catmur, & Bird, 2016; Gaigg, Maurice, & Bird, 2016). The 
second suggested theoretical modification relates to the scope of impairment expected to 
result from atypical interoception. Whereas Quattrocki and Friston (2014) argued for a wide-
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ranging impact upon socioemotional ability, including deficits in imitation, theory of mind, 
empathy and emotion recognition, Brewer and colleagues (2015) argued that evidence 
suggests that ability in several of these domains dissociates (e.g., Happé, Cook & Bird, 2017), 
making a single-factor explanation of competence across socioemotional domains unlikely.  
The link between alexithymia and atypical interoception (Brewer et al., 2016; Gaigg, 
et al., 2016; Herbert, Herbert, & Pollatos, 2011; Longarzo et al., 2015; Shah et al., 2016) has 
prompted the claim that atypical interoception represents a core impairment across 
psychiatric disorders (Brewer et al., 2016; Murphy et al., 2017). This claim is based on 
studies demonstrating the existence of the ‘p-factor’, a factor representing lesser-to-greater 
severity of psychopathology with associated disruption in neural circuitry, derived from 
factor-analytic studies of symptom structure across diagnostic categories (Caspi et al., 2014; 
Laceulle, Vollebergh, & Ormel, 2015; Lahey et al., 2012). While earlier work described the 
existence of the p-factor, noting that individuals exhibiting high levels of symptom severity in 
one domain (e.g., alcohol dependence) were likely to experience severe symptoms in several 
other domains (e.g., obsessive-compulsive tendencies or anxiety), the cause of the 
intercorrelation between symptom severity across domains was unspecified. The hypothesis 
that it is interoceptive ability which drives symptom intercorrelation, and therefore which 
gives rise to the symptom co-occurrence evidenced by the ‘p-factor’, is consistent with the 
finding that interoception has been shown to affect some of the most fundamental cognitive 
processes including learning (Katkin et al., 2001), decision-making (Werner et al., 2009), 
emotion processing (Füstös et al., 2013; Schandry, 1981; Terasawa et al., 2013; Wiens et al., 
2000), and cognitive control (Sueyoshi, Sugimoto, Katayama, & Fukushima, 2014), all of 
which are likely to impact on a range of symptoms. For example, poor interoception may 
result in atypical perception of reward and punishment, which in turn may cause atypical 
learning via operant conditioning, and impact upon decision making. Furthermore, atypical 
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interoception may result in aberrant perception of internal signals of one’s emotional state, 
resulting in delayed or less-effective use of emotion regulation strategies. The claim that 
interoception underlies the p-factor is also consistent with the fact that a large-scale meta-
analysis of brain morphology across six distinct psychiatric disorders identified left and right 
insula and dorsal anterior cingulate, areas thought to subserve interoception (Craig, 2002; 
Critchley & Harrison, 2013; Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004; but see 
Damasio, Damasio, & Tranel, 2013; Feinstein et al., 2016) as the only areas of grey matter 
loss common to all disorders (Goodkind et al., 2015). However, the central piece of evidence 
for the claim that interoceptive ability gives rise to the p-factor is the increased prevalence of 
alexithymia across psychiatric disorders, and evidence linking alexithymia with atypical 
interoception (Brewer et al., 2016; Gaigg et al., 2016.; Herbert et al., 2011; Longarzo et al., 
2015; Shah et al., 2016). If alexithymia is a valid marker of atypical interoception, then the 
almost universally increased prevalence of alexithymia across psychiatric disorders is the 
strongest evidence yet for the idea that atypical interoception may underlie the symptom 
commonalities between disorders.  
It should be noted, however, that although most interoceptive theories of mental 
health assume a unitary view of interoceptive ability (that interoceptive ability is stable 
regardless of the particular interoceptive signal to be perceived), recent studies challenge this 
assumption. While the vast majority of work assessing interoceptive ability has used standard 
tests of cardiac perception (Schandry, 1981), an increasing number of studies have tested 
interoceptive ability in different interoceptive domains; partly due to concerns over the 
validity of cardiac tests (Khalsa, Rudrauf, Sandesara, Olshansky, & Tranel, 2009), but also in 
order to test the assumption of a unitary interoceptive ability. Although earlier studies 
supported a unitary view, reporting moderate correlations between tests of gastric and cardiac 
perception (Herbert, Muth, Pollatos, & Herbert, 2012; Whitehead & Drescher, 1980), recent 
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work has reported a lack of correlation between other interoceptive domains (e.g., respiratory 
and cardiac; Ehlers & Breuer, 1992; Garfinkel, et al., 2016a; Pollatos, Herbert, Mai, & 
Kammer, 2016; Steptoe & Vögele, 1992). Furthermore, at the neural level, whilst the 
transmission of interoceptive information follows common pathways before its representation 
within insular and cingulate cortices, different receptors support the transduction of 
interoceptive signals across interoceptive domains (e.g., Craig, 2002). This neural 
architecture would therefore be consistent with both a unitary interoceptive ability and 
independent interoceptive abilities dependent upon the signal to be perceived. If interoceptive 
ability does vary, then the validity of theories claiming a role for interoception in the 
aetiology of clinical disorders (supported by an increased prevalence of alexithymia), needs 
to be assessed in interoceptive domains other than the perception of cardiac information. 
Furthermore, a fractionated interoceptive ability may have substantial implications for 
Brewer and colleagues’ (2015) suggested modifications of Quattrocki and Friston’s (2014) 
interoceptive theory of autism. For example, it is possible that interoceptive ability in some 
domains may, after all, be associated with autistic symptom severity rather than alexithymia. 
In addition, although speculative, it is possible that if interoception is fractionated then 
interoceptive ability may determine the full range of socioemotional ability suggested by 
Quattrocki and Friston (2014), and that dissociations are observed between different 
socioemotional abilities (Happé et al., 2017) because they rely on interoceptive ability in 
different domains. Thus it is crucial to test whether interoceptive ability is associated with 
alexithymia across interoceptive domains. 
Accordingly, this paper reports three experiments, each using a novel interoceptive 
test, which examine the association between alexithymic and autistic traits, and individual 
differences in non-cardiac interoception. Experiment 1 assesses individual propensity to use 
interoceptive information in the respiratory domain, whereas Experiments 2 and 3 assess the 
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ability to form an accurate percept of interoceptive information in the domains of muscular 
effort and taste, respectively. If alexithymia is confirmed as a marker of interoceptive 
impairment, regardless of the nature of the interoceptive signal, then interoceptive theories of 
mental health will gain an important source of support. Furthermore, given the increased 
prevalence of alexithymia across psychiatric disorders, evidence linking alexithymia and poor 
interoception across interoceptive domains would make it likely that a number of psychiatric 
disorders are characterised by a multi-domain failure of interoception. Conversely, if 
alexithymia is only associated with interoceptive ability in a limited range of interoceptive 
domains, then either interoceptive ability is unlikely to explain symptom intercorrelation 
across psychiatric disorders, or the impact of atypical interoception across symptom domains 
is mediated by perception of a very restricted range of interoceptive signals. Finally, if 
autistic traits are associated with interoceptive ability, then crucial evidence for Quattrocki 
and Friston’s (2014) model of autism will have been provided – supporting one of the few 
theories of autism which is able to address the condition from anatomical, genetic, 
computational, psychological and behavioural perspectives. 
Experiment 1 
Interoceptive ability is a multi-dimensional construct, and can usefully be dissociated 
into the different dimensions of interoceptive accuracy and sensibility (Garfinkel & Critchley, 
2013; Garfinkel, Seth, Barrett, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2015; McFarland, 1975; Terasawa et al., 
2013; Whitehead, Drescher, Heiman, & Blackwell, 1977). Interoceptive accuracy is a 
measure of the degree to which one can accurately perceive the internal state of one’s body, 
while interoceptive sensibility reflects the propensity to become aware of interoceptive 
information and to be focussed internally (Garfinkel et al., 2015). Interoceptive sensibility is 
thought to be reduced in alexithymia (Brewer et al., 2016; Longarzo et al., 2015) and autism 
(Garfinkel et al., 2016b); in common with interoceptive accuracy however, interoceptive 
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sensibility can vary across interoceptive domains (Ehlers & Breuer, 1992). Experiment 1 
therefore evaluated the impact of autistic and alexithymic traits on interoceptive sensibility in 
a non-cardiac domain. Furthermore, previous studies have reported interoceptive sensibility 
to be, at least partly, independent from interoceptive accuracy (Chentsova-Dutton & Dzokoto, 
2014; Garfinkel et al., 2016a, 2016b; Khalsa et al., 2008). Importantly, these studies compare 
an objective, performance measure of interoceptive accuracy with a self-report measure of 
interoceptive sensibility. While a perfectly valid approach, it remains ambiguous whether the 
lack of correspondence between the measures is a product of the dimension being tested (the 
accuracy of interoceptive perception vs the propensity to become aware of interoceptive 
information) or the nature of the test (objective vs subjective). The development of an 
objective test of interoceptive sensibility is therefore urgently required. Accordingly, 
Experiment 1 assessed interoceptive sensibility in the respiratory domain using a novel 
objective performance measure (see Fig 1a and Methods). 
Methods 
Participants 
Fifty-two participants took part in Experiment 1. Eight participants were excluded 
from the analysis owing to missing data, resulting in 44 usable datasets (Mage = 19.95, SDage 
= 2.17, range 18-27, 13 males). Participants were selected on the basis that they had no 
known psychiatric or neurological conditions and had no history of breathing difficulties 
(e.g., asthma). Scores on the Autism Quotient (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, 
& Clubley, 2001; AQ) were missing for one participant for which the mean score for all 
participants was entered. Eight participants met cut off for alexithymia (Toronto Alexithymia 
Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994); M = 47.07, SD = 14.17, Range 24-84) and 
two participants met cut off for autism (M = 17.02, SD = 8.06, Range, 3-35). Alexithymic and 
autistic traits were not correlated in this sample, r(44) = .138, p>.05. Ethical clearance was 
10 
 
 
 
granted by the local ethics committee. In line with the declaration of Helsinki, all participants 
gave informed consent and were fully debriefed upon task completion. Each participant 
received either course credits or a small honorarium in exchange for participation. No 
significant differences in the main dependent variable (difference error scores; see Results) 
were found between paid (M = 0.21, SD = .048) and credit-receiving (M = 0.26, SD = .052) 
participants, t(42) = 0.32, p>.05, d = 0.098, 95% CI for d [-0.027, 0.036]. 
Materials  
To quantify individual differences two questionnaires were employed: The TAS-20 
(Bagby et al., 1994) a 20-item measure of alexithymic traits, and the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001) a 50-item measure of autistic traits. A standard peak flow meter (Wright, 1978) was 
used to gauge participants’ speed of exhalation (‘respiratory output’). The peak flow meter is 
a medical device that calculates the maximal peak of air flow in one exhalation (peak 
expiratory flow), measured in litres per minute (L/min). This gauge was gently secured in a 
horizontal position using a vice clamp and elevated in line with each participant’s mouth 
using a stand (see Figure 1a). For each participant disposable mouth pieces were employed. 
Procedure 
Upon arrival in the lab participants completed the two questionnaires before the 
respiratory task. They were then given the following instructions, “In this experiment you 
will be asked to complete a large exhalation into the peak flow meter, a device that measures 
the maximum speed that you can push air out of your lungs. On each round this first 
exhalation will be taken as 100%. You will then be given an aim 30, 50, 70, 90% of that 
exhalation and asked to complete a second exhalation aiming for that percentage. After this 
you will be asked to estimate where you actually got to as a percentage of the first 
exhalation.” The instructions were followed by a demonstration from the experimenter using 
a mouthpiece that was not attached to the gauge. 
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On each trial participants were required to perform a large exhalation into the peak 
flow meter, on the experimenter’s count of three. This first exhalation was taken as their 
standard (100%) for that trial and was noted by the experimenter. They were then given a 
target (e.g., 50% of their first exhalation) and asked to perform a second exhalation on the 
experimenter’s count of three. The value recorded by the peak flow meter for their second 
exhalation was noted by the experimenter. Following this target exhalation, they were asked 
to estimate their performance as a percentage of the standard, and this value was recorded. 
This procedure was completed under two conditions, Internal and External. In the Internal 
condition each exhalation was accompanied by white noise played through headphones 
(Philips SHP2000 Over-Ear Corded Audio Headphones) connected to a laptop (Asus 
Zenbook ux305) for four seconds (~79 decibels) so that auditory information relating to the 
exhalation was not available to aid performance. The white noise was started by the 
experimenter on the count of two. In the External condition, each exhalation was 
accompanied by four seconds of white noise played externally through the laptop speakers 
(~79 decibels), starting on the count of two, with the laptop placed approximately one meter 
away from the right side of the participant. Auditory information relating to respiratory 
output was therefore available for use on the external condition, while the distracting effect of 
the white noise was approximately equated across conditions. In both conditions participants 
were blindfolded to prevent them from using the values on the gauge to estimate their 
performance. The order of these conditions was fully counterbalanced across participants. In 
each condition participants completed six blocks of four trial targets (30%, 50%, 70%, 90%), 
with the order of targets randomised across each block.  
To ensure that the smallest target (30%) could be measured, participants were 
required to blow over a threshold that was set at 200 L/min on their standard exhalation. If 
the participant’s standard exhalation fell below this threshold, it was repeated until above 
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threshold performance was reached. On rare occasions where exhalations fell between two 
values on the gauge the experimenter always rounded up to the nearest value. Prior to the 
experiment, one practice trial with a target of 50% was performed in order to ensure 
participants could comfortably reach the threshold and understood the task instructions. No 
feedback was provided at any point during the experiment. Prior to the experimental block 
with headphones participants were also given an example of the white noise to ensure it was 
at a comfortable level. Participants were informed that their hands must rest either at the 
bottom of the stand or on the table during exhalations. They were only permitted to use their 
hands to locate the mouth piece between trials before replacing them prior to exhalation. 
Participants were also asked to sit upright in the chair and not push forward onto the mouth 
piece during exhalations. Trials in which participants failed to follow these instructions were 
either repeated where possible, or removed from the analysis.   
Results 
Data Analysis 
For each trial (for both External and Internal conditions) absolute error scores 
(Absolute [(Actual second exhalation as a percentage of the standard – participant’s 
estimate)/Actual second exhalation as a percentage of the standard]) were computed (e.g., if 
the standard exhalation was 500 and the second exhalation 250 then the actual second 
exhalation as a percentage of the standard would be 50%. If the participant estimated 40% the 
equation would be as follows: Absolute [(50 – 40)/50] resulting in an error score of 0.2 for 
that trial). For each participant, in each condition, mean error scores were calculated. From 
these mean values difference error scores (Absolute Error Internal – Absolute Error External) 
were derived, quantifying the difference between performance on the Internal and External 
conditions. Negative values represent better performance (less error) on the Internal 
condition, values around zero indicate performance was not aided by the addition of 
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exteroceptive information in the External condition, and positive values indicate better 
performance on the External condition. Trials for which targets were beyond the range of the 
peak flow meter (<60 L/min), or the participant failed to follow instructions, were excluded 
from the analysis. Participants missing more than 8% of trials in any one condition were 
removed from further analysis. Two researchers collected data for this experiment, interrater 
reliability tests (to ensure consistent rounding up of values that fell between two points on the 
gauge) confirmed good reliability, K = .500, p<.0005, (95% CI [0.447, 0.653]) and difference 
error scores did not significantly vary between researchers one (M = 0.06, SD = 0.05) and two 
(M = 0.02, SD = 0.05), t(42)= .319, p>.05, d = 0.124, CI for d [-0.485, 0.730]. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was used to assess normality and indicated the data were normally 
distributed (D = .113, p>.05). In addition, to quantify participants’ ability to control 
respiratory output, average respiratory control scores were calculated according to the 
formula Absolute [(Target percentage – Actual percentage exhaled)], and controlled for in the 
analysis to ensure that participants’ ability to perceive the internal state of their body 
(interoception) was not influenced by their ability to control their respiratory output.  
The difference in estimation accuracy between Internal and External conditions 
served as a performance measure of interoceptive sensibility, and was associated with 
alexithymic traits (r(44) = .354, p=.018), such that increased alexithymia was associated with 
a reduced reliance on interoceptive information. This association remained after controlling 
for both autistic traits and ability to control respiratory output (r(40) = .321, p = .038). 
Neither autistic traits (r(44) = .017, p>.250) nor alexithymia was associated with the ability to 
control respiratory output (r(44) = -.173, p>.250). Participants reporting lower levels of 
alexithymia exhibited no performance benefits with the addition of exteroceptive information 
(Median split: low alexithymia group difference scores compared against zero, t(20) = .084, 
p>.250, d =0.02, 95% CI for d [-0.410, 0.446]) indicating a complete reliance on 
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interoceptive information, while those higher in alexithymic traits performed better with the 
addition of exteroceptive information (high alexithymia group t(22) = 5.51, p<.001, d =1.15, 
95% CI for d [0.611, 1.671]). Using the same measure, interoceptive propensity was not 
associated with autistic traits (r(44) = .224, p>.05). Results therefore support the 
characterisation of alexithymia as a general interoceptive impairment (Brewer et al., 2016), 
but question whether autism is associated with a reduced propensity to utilise interoceptive 
information.  
 
[Figure 1] 
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 used a performance measure to assess the degree to which alexithymic 
and autistic traits were associated with interoceptive sensibility in a non-cardiac domain. 
Experiment 2 instead assessed interoceptive accuracy, the degree to which participants can 
form an accurate percept of their body’s internal state, in an additional non-cardiac 
interoceptive domain: muscular effort (Wilson et al., 2002).  
Participants 
Fifty-two participants (Mage = 20.02, SDage, 2.93, range 18-32, 12 males, 4 left 
handed) took part in Experiment 2. Participants were selected on the basis that they had no 
known psychiatric or neurological conditions and had no history of shoulder, wrist or arm 
injuries. Ethical clearance was granted by the local ethics committee. In line with the 
declaration of Helsinki, all participants gave informed consent and were fully debriefed upon 
task completion. All participants received either course credits or a small honorarium in 
exchange for participation. No difference in interoceptive accuracy (accuracy scores; see 
Results) was found between paid or credit-receiving participants, t(50) =1.057, p>.05, d = 
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0.304, 95% CI for d [-0.265, 0.871]. AQ scores were missing for one participant for whom 
the mean score for all participants was entered. Nine participants met cut off for alexithymia 
(M= 47.29, SD = 13.08, Range 24-79) and six for autistic traits indicative of autism (M = 
19.79, SD = 9.67, Range, 3-45). In this sample there was a trend for high rates of alexithymia 
to be associated with higher autistic traits, r(52) = .241, p= .085. 
Materials  
For Experiment 2 three identical one litre buckets were filled with rice, so that the 
total weight of each sealed bucket was either 350, 510 or 780 grams. These amounts were 
randomly selected but chosen to be an integer multiple of ten.  
Procedure  
As in Experiment 1, participants initially completed two questionnaires: the TAS-20 
(Bagby et al., 1994) and the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). All participants were then given 
the following instructions “On each round a bucket filled with rice will be placed onto the 
upright palm of your dominant hand for two seconds. You will be asked to gently close your 
fingers when holding the bucket. It will then be replaced by an empty bucket, which the 
experimenter will fill with rice at a constant speed. You will be asked to say stop when you 
think that the bucket weighs the same as the previous bucket you were holding. It is very 
important that you keep your arm completely straight and at a 90-degree angle throughout the 
task. You should only say “stop” when you are absolutely certain the bucket weighs the 
same. Do not say stop because you are worried the bucket will overflow or that it has been 
pouring for a long time”. Participants were then given an example of this procedure with an 
empty bucket as the standard which was not filled with rice in order to ensure correct hand 
and arm positioning. The experimenter always placed the handle of the bucket over the 
metacarpophalangeal joint and ensured the participant’s arm was straight in front of them, in 
line with their shoulder, with their palm facing upwards (Figure 1b). Participants were 
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blindfolded throughout the task to ensure they could not use visual cues to gauge the weight 
of the bucket. After each trial the bucket was weighed by the experimenter and the weight 
was noted. Each participant completed one trial with each of the three buckets, the order of 
which was fully counterbalanced across participants. The task therefore required the 
participant to be able accurately to perceive the muscular effort required to hold the standard 
and target weights in an isometric position, and to determine when these signals matched. 
Results 
Data Analysis 
As in Experiment 1, absolute error scores were computed (Absolute [(Actual weight 
of the standard – participant’s estimate of the weight of the target bucket) / Actual weight of 
the standard]) for each trial, which were then averaged. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was 
used to assess normality and indicated marginal negative skew (D = .125, p=.040). To correct 
the data a square root transformation was performed. As a result, high scores indicate good 
performance whilst low scores represent increased error. 
Interoceptive accuracy (the absolute difference between the standard and target 
weights, and thus the participants’ ability to detect when the standard and target weights 
matched) was associated with alexithymic traits (r(52) = -.296, p=.033), even after 
controlling for autistic traits (r(49) = -.335; p=.016), such that an increasing degree of 
alexithymic traits was associated with poorer interoceptive accuracy. In contrast, 
interoceptive accuracy was not associated with autistic traits (r(52) = .111, p>.05).  
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 provided another test of the association between interoceptive accuracy 
and alexithymic and autistic traits with three novel features. First, interoceptive accuracy was 
assessed in a novel domain: taste (Craig, 2004; Critchley & Harrison, 2013). Second, an 
exteroceptive control task was included to ensure that any association with interoceptive 
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accuracy was specific to the perception of interoceptive signals, rather than due to general 
effects such as attention, motivation or differences in working memory. Third, both 
alexithymia and autism are associated with increased rates of depression and anxiety 
(Marchesi, Brusamonti, & Maggini, 2000; Strang et al., 2012), therefore the effect of these 
traits was controlled for in Experiment 3. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-eight participants completed Experiment 3. One participant was removed 
owing to a failure to follow instructions, and one outlier was removed resulting in 36 useable 
cases, [Mage = 21.03, SDage = 3.44, range 18-34, 5 males]. Control task data was missing for 
one participant for whom the mean score was entered. All participants were selected on the 
basis that they had no known psychiatric or neurological conditions, had English as their first 
language or a high level of English proficiency. Ethical clearance was granted by the local 
ethics committee. In line with the declaration of Helsinki, all participants gave informed 
consent and were fully debriefed upon task completion. All participants received either 
course credits or a small honorarium in exchange for participation. Only three participants 
received credits, but no significant differences were observed between paid and credit-
receiving participants on the taste task (t(34) =  .524, p>.05, d = 0.316, 95% CI for d [-.870, 
1.498]), or the exteroceptive control task (t(34) = 1.349, p>.05, d = 0.813, 95% CI for d [-
.390, 2.005]).  
11 participants met cut off for alexithymia (M= 48.47, SD = 14.41, Range 24-79) and 
two for autistic traits indicative of autism (M = 17.00, SD = 8.93, Range, 3-36). A typical 
range of scores was observed for state anxiety (M = 32.61, SD = 8.83, Range 20-60), trait 
anxiety (M = 41.17, SD = 9.49, Range 23-61), and depression (M = 8.39, SD = 6.77, Range 0-
27). In this sample alexithymia was positively associated with autistic traits, r(36) = .359, 
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p=.031, depression, r(36) = .459, p=.005, and trait anxiety, r(36) = .536, p<.001. There was 
also a trend for alexithymia to be associated with higher state anxiety, r(36) = .318, p=.066. 
Likewise, autistic traits were positively associated with trait anxiety, r(36) = .598, p<.001, 
and state anxiety, r(36) = .461, p=.005. There was also a trend for autistic traits to be 
associated with higher depression scores, r(36) = .313, p = .063.  
Materials  
Four questionnaires were employed, the TAS-20 (Bagby et al., 1994), AQ (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001), State and Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983) and the 
Beck Depression Scale (BDI; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). 
Taste task 
For the taste task seven solutions of salt water were created, ranging from .102mol - 
.292mol in steps of 16%. This stepwise selection was determined by extensive piloting and 
informed by prior research into the just noticeable difference for taste solutions (Schutz & 
Pilgrim, 1957). These solutions were made using 99.9% pure NaCl (Sigma-Aldrich) and 
distilled water (www.distilledwatercompany.com). All solutions were made a maximum of 
two weeks prior to the experiment and stored in sealed containers at a constant temperature of 
21 degrees Celsius away from direct sunlight. For each participant seven plastic disposable 
pipettes, one for each solution, was employed. 
The participant was presented with the standard (.197mol), at the beginning of each 
trial. Participants were then presented with a target solution from one of the seven stimulus 
levels. Across the experiment 16 blocks of seven trials were completed, one trial per block 
for each of the seven levels. The order in which the targets were presented was randomised 
across each block. 
Exteroceptive Control task 
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The exteroceptive control task format was identical in format to the taste task and was 
created in Matlab 8.0 (Mathworks) with the Cogent 2000 toolbox 
(http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent). Stimuli were presented on a Toshiba Satellite laptop 
computer, with a 60hz refresh rate and screen size of 15.6 inches. Seven grey patches (495 x 
428 pixels) were created, with the fourth patch taken as the standard. The six remaining 
patches ranged -30% to +30% either side of the standard in RGB colour change steps of 10%. 
This selection was determined through extensive piloting. On each trial the standard colour 
patch was presented for 1000ms in the centre of the screen. Following an inter-stimulus 
interval of 1000ms one of the seven target patches was presented for 1000ms in the centre of 
the screen. Following stimulus offset, the user was prompted to select whether the target was 
“<brighter or darker>?” than the standard by pressing the left or right arrow key, respectively. 
This response immediately triggered the start of the next trial. Sixteen blocks of each of the 
seven targets were employed and target order was fully randomised across each block.  
Procedure  
Following questionnaire completion, participants completed the taste and 
exteroceptive control tasks, the order of which was counterbalanced across participants.  
Taste task 
Prior to the taste task participants were asked to rinse and gargle with distilled water. 
On each trial, participants were given 2ml of the standard taste solution that was pipetted 
under their tongue using a disposable pipette (Figure 1c). They were asked to taste the 
solution and then spit it into a bucket. This was followed by a rinse and spit with distilled 
water. After rinsing participants were given 2ml of a target solution, pipetted in the same way 
as the standard. After spitting this out they were asked to state whether the second solution 
was more or less salty than the first. This was followed by a second rinse and spit with 
distilled water prior to the next trial. During the task the experimenter always said “number 
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one” when presenting the standard and “number two” when presenting the target. This was 
always followed by the same prompt “was the second one more or less salty?”. Participants 
were given one practice trial prior to the experiment where the standard was presented twice. 
No feedback was provided. All participants were allowed a break half way through the 
experiment. Throughout the experiment participants were blindfolded to ensure they could 
not learn to associate a particular solution with a certain intensity. 
Exteroceptive Control task 
During the exteroceptive control task participants were seated approximately 60cm 
away from the computer screen in a dimly lit room. The following instructions were 
presented, “In this experiment you will see two grey squares. Your task is to decide whether 
the second square is brighter or darker than the first. Press left for brighter (<) and right for 
darker (>). When you are ready please press space to begin the practice”. Participants were 
given one practice block to familiarise themselves with the response keys and a break was 
given half way through the experiment.  
Results 
Data Analysis  
Both the taste task and the exteroceptive control task were analysed by fitting 
psychometric functions to participants’ judgements of whether the stimulus was greater (e.g., 
more salty or brighter) or less than (e.g., less salty or dimmer) than the standard. Thus, both 
tasks required the participant to identify the direction of stimulus discrepancy between the 
target and the standard. Separate cumulative Gaussian functions were fitted for each 
participant based on 112 observations (16 presentations × 7 stimulus levels) using the 
Palamedes toolbox (Prins & Kingdom, 2009). Each function estimated one parameter of 
interest, the slope. Slope estimates measure the precision with which stimuli are categorised; 
steep and shallow slopes are associated with low and high noise estimates, respectively. Low 
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slope estimates indicate insensitivity to stimulus strength, and therefore inaccurate 
categorisation. Therefore, participants’ taste and colour sensitivity (and therefore 
interoceptive/exteroceptive accuracy) was indexed by the slope of their psychometric 
function; with steeper slopes indicating more precise categorisation. Slope measures were 
free to vary and estimated initially at 50% and 10%, respectively. Guess and lapse rates were 
fixed at 0.  
Analysis of the interoceptive data was carried out using hierarchical regression. 
Participant age, gender, depression, state and trait anxiety scores were entered into the first 
step of the regression model, autistic traits into the second, and alexithymia into the third. 
Exteroceptive sensitivity scores were also entered into the first step so that any variance 
accounted for by alexithymia or autistic traits was specific to the interoceptive task, and not 
due to non-specific factors such as motivation, working memory, or other general cognitive 
factors. At step one only state anxiety predicted worse taste sensitivity (standardised  = 
-.787, t = -3.509, p<.001, 95% CI for  [-0.468, -0.123], ΔR2 = 23.7%). All other predictors 
were non-significant (all  < .516; all p>.05). The overall model was significant, F(6,29) = 
2.814, p=.028. When autistic traits were added (step two) only state anxiety ( = -.785, t = -
3.445, p=.002, 95% CI for  [-0.471, -0.120]) predicted worse taste sensitivity. The inclusion 
of autistic traits did not increase the variance accounted for by the model, 0.1% (F(1, 28) 
= .066, p>.05) and the overall regression model was not significant, F(7, 28) = 2.343, p 
= .051. When alexithymia was added (step 3) both state anxiety ( = -.843, t = -3.958, 
p<.001, 95% CI for  [-0.481, -0.153]) and alexithymia ( = -.422, t = -2.343 p=.027, 95% CI 
for  [-0.182, -0.012]) predicted worse taste sensitivity. There was also a trend for trait 
anxiety to predict better taste sensitivity ( = .690, t = 1.987, p=.058, 95% CI for  [-0.009, 
0.492]). The inclusion of alexithymia significantly increased the variance accounted for by 
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the model, 10.7% F(1, 27) = 5.489, p = .027 and the overall model was significant, F(8, 27) = 
3.066, p = .014.  
The equivalent analysis was completed on data from the exteroceptive control task. 
Participant age, gender, depression, taste sensitivity scores, state and trait anxiety scores were 
entered into the first step of the regression model, autistic traits into the second, and 
alexithymia into the third. At all steps none of the variables predicted exteroceptive 
sensitivity (all p>.20) and the overall model was not significant F(8, 27) = .879, p>.50). 
However, although the residuals were normally distributed (D = .115, p>.05) the relationship 
between the predicted and observed residuals was not normal. To further confirm the absence 
of a relationship between alexithymia and the exteroceptive control task a Spearman’s rank 
order correlation was conducted which confirmed that performance on the exteroceptive 
control task did not correlate with alexithymia, r(36) = .180, p>.250.  
General Discussion 
This set of three studies aimed to assess claims of a link between alexithymia and 
impaired interoception in the light of recent evidence that interoceptive ability, presently 
assessed almost exclusively within the cardiac domain, may vary depending upon the 
interoceptive signal to be perceived. Experiment 1 utilised a novel measure of interoceptive 
sensibility in the respiratory domain to reveal that individuals high in alexithymic traits (but 
not autistic traits) relied on exteroceptive information when judging respiratory output, 
whereas those low in alexithymic traits relied on interoceptive information. Experiments 2 
and 3 assessed interoceptive accuracy in two novel domains: muscular effort and taste. In 
each case increasing alexithymic traits (but not autistic traits) were associated with less 
accurate perception of interoceptive information. Furthermore, Experiment 3 established that 
the relationship between alexithymic traits and interoceptive accuracy was specific to 
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interoception – there was no relationship between alexithymic traits and a closely matched 
exteroceptive control task – and not an artefact of co-occurring depression or anxiety.  
The current results are consistent with the proposal that alexithymia may be a marker 
of a multi-dimensional, multi-domain, interoceptive impairment – associated both with 
reduced interoceptive accuracy and decreased integration of interoceptive information with 
ongoing cognition regardless of the interoceptive signal under consideration. Indeed, given 
discrepancies between self-reported interoceptive awareness and interoceptive accuracy (e.g., 
Garfinkel et al., 2015), these data are consistent with existing data suggesting that self-
reported alexithymia may be a useful screening tool for identifying those with poor 
interoception (Brewer et al., 2016; Gaigg et al., 2016.; Herbert et al., 2011; Longarzo et al., 
2015; Shah et al., 2016). 
This evidence that alexithymia may be a marker of atypical interoception is in line 
with the proposal by Brewer and colleagues (Brewer et al., 2016) that interoceptive ability 
may underlie the existence of the ‘p-factor’, a first-order over-arching factor representing 
lesser-to-greater severity of psychopathology and associated neural dysfunction identified by 
confirmatory factor-analytic work on symptom co-occurrence across diagnostic categories 
(Caspi et al., 2014; Laceulle et al., 2015; Lahey et al., 2012). Indeed, the link between 
interoception and alexithymia, together with evidence linking alexithymia and various 
psychiatric disorders, raises the possibility that atypical interoception may characterise 
several psychiatric conditions. As many symptoms contributing to the p-factor model 
(symptoms found across a range of disorders) may be driven by atypical interoception (e.g., 
addictive behaviours, weight change; for a detailed discussion of the mechanism by which 
interoception may contribute to addiction see Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2012) or be inherently 
interoceptive (e.g., fatigue, muscle tension), this raises the possibility that the statistically 
observed ‘p-factor’ is driven by a common deficit in interoception, which in turn impacts 
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upon a range of symptoms, accounting for observed symptom inter-correlations (see Murphy 
et al., 2016).  
The lack of an association between autistic traits and interoceptive ability is not 
consistent with previous claims that autism is associated with interoceptive impairment (e.g. 
Quattrocki & Friston, 2014), although it should be noted that the current study did not assess 
interoception in individuals diagnosed with autism and the association between autistic traits 
and interoception in the typical population may not be as strong as when tested in diagnosed 
individuals.  
Although these findings are in line with previous studies reporting an association 
between alexithymia and poor interoception (Brewer et al., 2016; Gaigg et al., 2016; Herbert 
et al., 2011; Longarzo et al., 2015; Shah et al., 2016), they may be considered surprising 
given recent evidence that interoceptive ability depends upon the interoceptive signal to be 
perceived (Garfinkel et al., 2016; Pollatos et al., 2016; Steptoe & Vögele, 1992). If 
alexithymia is associated with interoceptive accuracy across cardiac, muscular, and taste 
interoceptive domains, and with interoceptive sensibility across an even greater number of 
domains (Brewer et al., 2016; Longarzo et al., 2015), then, although not explicitly examined 
by this series of experiments, this is at least consistent with a unitary interoceptive ability 
regardless of the interoceptive signal to be perceived. While any explanation of this paradox 
is necessarily speculative, it is of note that there has been little opportunity, given the 
interoceptive tasks that currently exist, to equate task demands across interoceptive domains. 
For example, some tasks measure participants’ ability to detect interoceptive stimuli (e.g. 
when an obstruction is applied to respiration (Garfinkel et al., 2016a; Pollatos et al., 2016)), 
others assess ability to determine the magnitude of interoceptive signals (such as in the 
muscular effort and taste tasks used in Experiments 2 and 3), while others measure ability to 
discriminate between interoceptive signals (Giguère et al., 2016). Furthermore, tasks are not 
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generally equated for speed, accuracy, working memory, or sustained attention demands 
across tasks; for example, the standard heartbeat tracking task (Schandry, 1981) requires a 
sustained period of attention for up to 100 seconds, whereas the respiratory task used by 
Pollatos and colleagues (Pollatos et al., 2016) required participants to sustain attention for 
only a few seconds during a period of exhalation. Finally, the degree to which interoception 
contributes to performance on several interoceptive tasks is not always clear due to the lack 
of matched exteroceptive control tasks. For example, the heartbeat tracking task is sometimes 
accompanied by a control task in which individuals are required to estimate the duration (in 
seconds) of time periods equivalent to those over which they count their heartbeats (Ainley, 
Brass, & Tsakiris, 2014; Shah et al., 2016). Although the duration estimation task has the 
same counting and sustained attention demands as the cardiac tracking task, participants are 
not required to detect exteroceptive signals (which could be matched to the average 
detectability of heartbeats), and therefore the duration estimation task is not a fully matched 
control task: for example, it does not control for any response bias which may affect 
performance on the cardiac tracking task. There is clearly an urgent need for further tests of 
interoceptive ability, with appropriate control tasks, that can be matched for difficulty, in 
order to address the question of whether interoceptive ability is invariant across interoceptive 
domains, or whether it varies depending upon the signal to be perceived, across both typical 
samples and clinical populations.  
Experiment 1 reported a new test described as a measure of interceptive sensibility. In 
this task performance was measured under two conditions which varied the availability of 
interoceptive and exteroceptive cues. Participants reporting lower levels of alexithymia 
exhibited no performance decrements when the availability of exteroceptive cues was 
curtailed, indicating this information was ignored when judging respiratory output, while 
those higher in alexithymic traits performed better with the addition of exteroceptive 
26 
 
 
 
information. Previously, interoceptive sensibility has been measured via self-report and 
defined as “the individual’s belief in their interoceptive ability and the degree to which they 
feel engaged by interoceptive signals” (Garfinkel et al., 2015). Although differentiation of 
interoceptive sensibility and accuracy has been hugely beneficial for the field, the results 
obtained in Experiment 1 suggest that it may be beneficial to further sub-divide interoceptive 
sensibility; distinguishing between 1) self-reported interoceptive accuracy and 2) the 
awareness of interoceptive signals. We suggest a 2 x 2 factorial structure of interoception 
(illustrated in Figure 2) in which the first factor distinguishes between interoceptive accuracy 
and the propensity to become aware of interoceptive information (for example, an individual 
may be typically unaware of interoceptive signals but perform well when explicitly asked to 
attend to interoceptive information. In such a case, the individual would have good 
interoceptive accuracy, but a low propensity to become aware of interoceptive information). 
The second factor distinguishes one’s objective ‘performance’ in each of these domains from 
one’s belief about the degree to which one can form accurate percepts of interoceptive states 
and one’s propensity to become aware of interoceptive information (for example, 
distinguishing between an individual’s objective performance on tests of interoceptive 
accuracy and propensity from their self-reported beliefs regarding these dimensions of 
interoception). Under this account, the test described in Experiment 1 could be described as 
an objective measure of the propensity to be aware of interoceptive information; performance 
in a condition where there is no requirement to rely in interoceptive information can be 
compared in conditions where there is, a requirement to depend upon interoceptive 
information in order to determine the reliance on interoceptive information. It should be 
noted however, that even this more fine-grained 2 x 2 structure is an oversimplification. One 
could also distinguish between the degree to which one is aware of interoceptive information 
and the degree to which one uses this information in tasks such as that used in Experiment 1. 
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Furthermore, the use of interoceptive information is likely governed by the confidence one 
has in one’s own interoceptive accuracy; for example, individuals with greater confidence in 
their abilities may be more likely to utilise interoceptive signals.  
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[Figure 2] 
 
In summary, these experiments confirm that alexithymia affects multiple dimensions 
and domains of interoception, consistent with proposals that atypical interoception may 
represent a common factor across psychopathology. This evidence also emphasises the need 
for further sub-division of interoceptive sensibility, separating objective and subjective 
propensity to prioritise interoceptive signals, and highlights the need for further examination 
of interoceptive accuracy and how it varies across interoceptive domains using measures that 
are equated for task demands.   
Funding: JM was supported by a doctoral studentship from the Economic and Social 
Research Council [1599941; ES/J500057/1]. GB was supported by the Baily Thomas 
Charitable Trust. 
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Context paragraph  
A growing body of evidence indicates that alexithymia may best be considered a failure of 
interoception. Yet, recent evidence that interoception may fractionate depending on the 
bodily signal to be perceived highlights the need to reassess these claims across unexamined 
domains of interoception. The aim of the authors was to build upon existing research and 
extend this by examining whether alexithymia is associated with reduced accuracy and 
propensity to utilise interoceptive signals, which is related to their current work examining 
individual differences in interoception and the relationship between interoception and mental 
health.  
Author Note  
The data presented here has previously been disseminated at conferences by the authors.    
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Figure Legends 
Figure 1. (a) Example trial in the respiratory task; participants were asked to estimate their 
ability to produce a target exhalation defined with respect to a standard exhalation under 
conditions manipulating reliance on external and internal cues. The difference in estimation 
accuracy between internal and external cue conditions is plotted, demonstrating alexithymia 
was associated with a reliance on external cues. (b) Example trial in the muscular effort task; 
participants indicated when the target weight matched that of the standard. Alexithymia was 
associated with reduced accuracy. (c) Example trial in the taste task; participants reported 
whether the target solution was more or less salty than the standard. Taste sensitivity was 
modelled by fitting psychometric functions, the plot demonstrates that increasing levels of 
alexithymia were associated with poorer taste sensitivity, even after controlling for a number 
of potentially confounding variables (see text for details).  
 
Figure 2. Illustration of the proposed 2 x 2 factorial structure of interoception. Factor 1 
distinguishes between interoceptive accuracy (the ability to accurately perceive the internal 
state of one’s body) and awareness (the propensity to become aware of interoceptive signals). 
Factor 2 distinguishes between an individual’s beliefs in their interoceptive ability (self-
report) and their objective performance on tests of interoception across Factor 1 dimensions 
(see text for details). Therefore, this model suggests four possible dimensions of interoception 
1) the ability to accurately perceive the internal state of one’s body as measured by objective 
tests (e.g., the heartbeat tracking task; Schandry, 1981) 2) the ability to accurately self-report 
one’s ability to perceive the internal state of one’s body 3) one’s self-reported propensity to 
become aware of interoceptive signals (e.g., the Body Perception Questionnaire; Porges, 
1993) and 4) one’s propensity to utilise internal signals as measured by objective tests (e.g., 
the respiratory output task; Experiment 1).  
